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TAKING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE REGULATION OF
MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS
Thomas Krider
Abstract: This Comment analyzes the 1997 financial crisis in Asia and its effect
on U.S. mutual fund investors. The crisis was most acute in, and this Comment focuses
on, the countries of Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. The lack of transparency in
these countries led to substantial losses for U.S. investors whose money was in nontransparent organizations through their ownership of mutual funds. The International
Monetary Fund responded to the Asian crisis with aid packages intended to prevent the
insolvency of those countries in financial trouble. As part of the IMF's program, one of
the primary requirements for receiving aid is for each country to improve the level of
financial transparency required of its business and financial sectors. U.S. mutual fund
investors could be better protected against unnecessary losses, and the success of the
IMF program greatly enhanced, by either increasing the level of disclosure required of
the underlying securities held in a mutual fund's portfolio, or by prohibiting investment
by mutual funds in companies who lack adequate financial transparency.

I.

INTRODUCTION

After years of dramatic expansion,' many of Asia's economies
experienced severe financial crisis in 1997.2 In response, the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") has stepped in and offered individual countries
financing packages intended to stabilize their economies and help relieve
some of the hardship being experienced. 3 To receive this financial assistance,
however, the IMF is requiring numerous fiscal and macroeconomic changes
1 "During the past 20 years, the high growth performers in east and southeast Asia have
persistently grown at 6-8 percent per annum." Shigcmitsu Sugisaki, Deputy Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund, Address at the 1998 Harvard Asia Business Conference, (Jan. 30, 1998),
1998)
3,
March
(visited
Fund Homepage
International Monetary
in
available
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/013098.HTM>.
2 The crisis has been described as "[a devaluation of national currencies in Asia which] triggered a
region-wide crisis, in which stock markets gave up as much as 35 percent of their value, inflated real
estate prices fell through the floor, banks collapsed, and hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians, rich
and poor, lost their jobs and fortunes." Michael S. Serrill, Catching the Asian Flu; The Sickness That Put
the Tigers in the Tank Causes a Big Sneeze in the U.S. Market, TIME, Nov. 3, 1997, at 44.
3 It is estimated that the cost of the IMF bailout package for Asia will be between $118 billion and
$163 billion. Thailand has already received $22 billion, Indonesia is estimated to require $40 billion, and
Korea has asked for $55 billion and may need as much as $75-100 billion. Bryan T. Johnson & John
Sweeney, Down the Drain: Why the IMF Bailout in Asia is Wasteful and Won't Work, HERITAGE
FOUNDATION REPORTS, Dec. 5, 1997.
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within the recipient countries.4 Included among these changes is a
requirement to create transparency in the financial reporting of domestic
corporations by implementing accounting practices consistent with
5
internationally accepted accounting principles.
The lack of financial transparency in both the government and private
sectors of these countries has had a direct effect on investors within the
United States.6 Americans who were most immediately and directly harmed
by the Asian crisis are those investors who relied on mutual funds as their
vehicle into the Asian equity markets.7 Mutual fund securities purchased by
investors in the United States are subject to regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 8 These funds fall under the Investment Company Act
of 1940 which requires significant disclosure and regulation of mutual fund
management. 9 Yet these regulations, unlike those in other areas of investing,
do not require disclosure of the financial positions of the individual stocks
held within a mutual fund's portfolio.' 0 This lack of disclosure leaves
investors in overseas mutual funds without many of the safeguards normally
found when investing in individual corporate securities within the United
States. 1I

Through legislation, the United States could help to ensure the success
of the financial transparency requirements of the IMF bailout package, and at
the same time, improve investor safeguards within the United States. This
legislation could be targeted at either the types of disclosure required
regarding the financial position of stocks held in a mutual fund's portfolio, or
4 In the case of Thailand, the Thai government has signed a "Letter of Intent"
dated February 24,
1998, addressed to Michel Chamdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, in which it outlines the measures
it has committed to implementing in conjunction with the IMF financial package. Government of
Thailand, Letter of Intent, available in InternationalMonetary FundHomepage (visited Mar. 24, 1998)

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/022498.htm> [hereinafter Letter ofIntent]. The term Letter of Intent
is used by the IMF to describe the document(s) issued by a recipient government to the IMF delineating
the country's program for economic reforms. Thailand's "Letter of Intent" is also referred to as
"Memorandum of Economic Policies of the Royal Thai Government."
5

id.

Many key pieces of financial information are frequently withheld by corporations, contributing
to
the collapse of the region's stock markets and the devaluing of many of its currencies. Shanthi Kalathil,
6

Asia Gets a HardLesson in Costs of Firms' Murky Bookkeeping, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1997, at Al 9.
7 Some examples of mutual fund performances are Merrill Lynch's
Developing Capital Fund
(high-$17.91 low-$11.04 1oss-38%), Pacific Basin Fund (high-S26.84 low-$16.49 Ioss-38%), Putnam's
Asian Pacific Growth Fund (high-$14.86 1ow-$10.26 loss-31%), and Nomura's Pacific Basin Fund (high$15.47 Iow-$9.40 1oss-39%).
Data Broadcasting Center, DBC Online (visited Mar. 28, 1998)

<http://www.dbc.com>.
8 The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1997).
9 Id.
10 Id.
1 Id.
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at requiring the equities held within a fund's portfolio to meet the minimum
transparency requirements proposed by the IMF.
This Comment will begin by looking at some of the underlying
problems which led to the collapse of several Asian economies at the end of
1997. In particular, it will focus on Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. It
will then discuss the IMF's program for stability and long term solutions,
focusing primarily on the requirement for increased financial transparency
through implementation of internationally accepted accounting principles.
Next, it will look at the law governing mutual fund disclosure in the United
States. It will look at how mutual funds are allowed to own securities in
corporations which are not themselves subject to strict oversight and
regulation. It will show that U.S. investors in overseas mutual funds lack
sufficient information to make rational investment decisions. This Comment
will recommend that the United States amend its statutory and regulatory
structure to require mutual fund managers to improve disclosure regarding the
transparency of the equities they hold, or to allow investment only in
corporations which adhere to internationally accepted accounting principles.
Finally, it will argue that the latter of these two alternatives is the best way to
ensure the success of the IMF program.
II.

THE TIGERS' WOES

A.

The Thorn

The miraculous Asian Tigers, 12 whose economies raced and roared
impressively over the course of many years, have collapsed to the ground,
whimpering with a festering infection in their paws, caused by a thorn the
Tigers knew existed but chose to ignore. 13 The Asian economic expansion
had been lauded throughout the 1990's as the blueprint for the economic

12 Investment companies established specific mutual funds targeted at capturing the region's
economic expansion. The "Tigers" which most of these funds targeted were the countries of Hong Kong,
Singapore, Malaysia, China, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. Colonial
Launches Innovative Ad Campaign, PR Newswire, Dec. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
13 See Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, The IMF and the Asian Crisis,
Address at Forum Funds Lecture at the University of California, Los Angeles (Mar. 20, 1998), available

in

International

Monetary

Fund

Homepage

(visited

Mar.

23,

<http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1998/032098.HTM> [hereinafter Fischer Address].

1998)
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salvation of developing nations. 14 Yet several of the Tigers have stumbled
due to their inability, or unwillingness, to see the warning signs that existed
on the horizon.' 5 Some of the warning signs included: (1) large external
deficits along with property and stock market bubbles; (2) pegged exchange
rates which required large amounts of foreign reserve to maintain; and (3) lax
prudential rules and financial oversight of the banking industries. 16 The
events which led to a crisis within each of the countries may have been
unique to each particular country, but in the end, each has come, "hat in
hand,"' 7 seeking help from the international community via the IMF. is
The first of Asia's economic juggernauts to fall was Thailand.' 9 After
years of pegging its currency to the U.S. dollar,20 the Thai government was no
longer willing, or able, to purchase enough Thai baht to maintain its exchange
value. 21 The Thai central bank finally removed the fixed exchange rate on
July 2, 1997, and allowed the baht to float against the dollar.22 Once the
currency was allowed to float, it immediately lost seventeen percent of its
value against the U.S. dollar and twelve percent of its value against the yen.23
The Thai stock market followed the baht's devaluation with a collapse of its
own. In early January 1997, the Thai Stock Exchange closed at 828 points. 24
A year later the index was all the way down to 495 points, 25 a drop of over
26
forty percent.
Prior to July 2, 1997, the Thai government had used a substantial
portion of its foreign reserves to buy baht in an attempt to maintain its
14 A study published in Oil and Industry News encourages
Arab countries to follow the model
provided by East Asia. Arabs Urged to Copy Asian Economic "Miracle," Agence Fr. Presse, Feb. 14,
1996, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
s Fischer Address, supra note 13.
16 Id.
", Leo Abruzzese, JapanKey to Asian Crisis, J. COM., Dec.
5, 1997, at 7A.
IS Id.

'9 While South Korea and Indonesia did not request assistance until late in 1997,
Thailand first

requested IMF help in July 1997. David Holley, Thailand Seeks Economic Aid Package From JMF; Asia:
The Action is TriggeredBy InternationalPressureon Bangkok to Come to Terms With the Devaluation of
Its Currency, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1997, at DI.
20

Thailand's central bank had made currency stability its top priority for the last thirteen years.

Exchange Rates. Thaied up in Knots, ECONOMIST, July 5, 1997, at 71.

21 The central bank spent $15 billion buying baht in an
attempt to prop-up the currency at an
exchange rate of 25 baht to the dollar. Tony Emerson, After the Rescue. NEWSWEEK, Aug. 25, 1997, at

37.

Id.
Exchange Rates, supra note 20.
24 Thai Stocks Rebound, UPI, Jan. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
25 InternationalEconomy: Asia, BARCLAYS BANK
ECON. REV., Feb. 19, 1998, at 27.
26 (828-495)/828=.4028
22
23
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exchange value against the dollar. 27 Once the devaluation of the currency
occurred, Thailand was left without sufficient resources to pay its bills.28
This deficiency forced the government to seek financial protection
against its
29
creditors through loans from the international community.
Indonesia's crisis primarily centered around the collapse of its financial
sector. 30 Following the deregulation of Indonesia's banking industry several
years ago, the number of banks in Indonesia mushroomed to a total of twohundred and forty by the time of the crisis in 1997. 31 The increase in the
number of banks became a problem because, as the number of banks
increased, the government failed to increase its monitoring over the banking
industry.32 The lack of regulatory oversight allowed Indonesian banks to
make a significant number of bad loans.33 The fear of a run on bank deposits
led the government to close or suspend the operation of seven banks 34 and to

take over the management of forty-seven others. 5 Indonesia also saw its
currency plummet as a result of the country's economic troubles. 36 The
rupiah lost eighty-five percent of its value against the dollar between early
1997 and January of 1998. 37 This made servicing their international debt
obligations nearly impossible. 38 The collapse of the rupiah had caused
27 Thailand had $20 billion remaining in foreign currency reserves, but was only months away from
debts coming due worth in excess of $50 billion. Emerson, supra note 21, at 37.
28 id.

29 The initial package was for $16 billion with contributions coming from the IMF ($4 billion),
Japan ($4 billion), Australia ($1 billion), Hong Kong ($1 billion), Malaysia ($1 billion), Singapore ($1
billion), Indonesia ($500 million), South Korea ($500 million), and the Asian Development Bank ($3
billion). Hiroshi Yamagiwa, Thai Bailout Plan to Cost $16 Billion, JAPAN TIMES WKLY. INT'L ED., Aug.

18, 1997, at 1, 6.
'0 On November 1, 1997, the government of Indonesia closed sixteen banks stating that they were
unhealthy and insolvent. Closed Indonesian Banks Begin Refunding Depositors, Agence Fr. Presse, Nov.

13, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.

3 How Far is Down?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 15, 1997, at 19.
32 Id.

33 Indonesia has attempted to implement a plan to guarantee the obligations of the country's banks
and establish a group to dispose of troubled banks and their "massive bad loans." Paul Blustein,
Indonesia Announces Bank Guarantee Plan; Troubled Nation Moves to Avert Collapse of System,
Reassure Foreign Investors, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1998, at D3.

34 One newswire reported shortly after the events that "[tlhe Indonesian government froze Saturday
the operation of seven commercial banks-three of them linked to the first family-and a governmentappointed agency took over management of seven others, including a state bank, effective that day."
Christine T. Tjandraningsih, Indonesia Closes 7 Banks, Takes Over 7 Others, Japan Econ. Newswire,

Apr. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curmws File.
35 Indonesia's agency responsible for restructuring the banking sector now oversees a total of 54
banks. Indonesia's Banks, No Credit, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 11, 1998, at 57.
36 Paul Handley, Can Indonesia Survive Suharto?, INSTrunTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1998, at 72.
37 Id.

38 Id.
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speculation that a large number of Indonesian corporations were also in
serious trouble. 39 This concern was reflected in the change of the value of the
Stock Exchange index, which lost thirty-three percent of its value between
June 1997 and January 1998.40
South Korea has suffered many of the same problems as Thailand and
Indonesia. 4 1 South Korea drained its foreign currency reserve through months
of attempting to uphold the value of the won. 2 The lack of reserves led to a
serious international debt crisis in the fall of 1997. 43 The debt crisis,
combined with dramatic falls in the value of both the won and the South
Korean stock market,44 made international investors extremely nervous about
South Korea. 45 Unlike Thailand, whose crisis was triggered by an exchange
rate collapse,46 or Indonesia, where failed banks led the way, 7 South Korea's
trouble began with several bankruptcies involving some of its large private
corporate conglomerates.48 These primarily family-owned conglomerates,
known as chaebols, 49 control much of the wealth in Korea. 50 They have
traditionally shunned equity financing, 5' instead using enormous debt, based
upon political rather than financial collateral, to run their enterprises. 2 The

39 "Mohammad Syahrial of Pentasena Securities said that only 22 of the 280-odd companies on the
Jakarta Stock Exchange appeared financially viable.'" Id.
40 InternationalEconomy: Asia, supra note 25, at 27.

4' The IMF's Stanley Fischer stated in a speech that "Thailand, Indonesia and Korea face a number
of similar problems, including the loss of market confidence, deep currency depreciation, weak financial
systems, and excessive unhedged foreign borrowing by the domestic private sector." Fischer Address,
supra note 13.
42 Velisarios Kattoulas, Korea Hovers on Brink As Stocks Plummet
7%; IMF Bailout May Be
Needed This Month, Economists Say, as Won Hits a Record Low, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 8, 1997, at

13. 43 South Korea had foreign debts totaling
$110 billion, but a currency reserve dropping
below a

level of $30 billion. Troubled,but Basically Sound, Bus. KOREA, Dec., 1997, at 29-31.

44 During the turbulent period in the fall of 1997, both the won and the stock market lost half
their

value. Sandra Sugawara, In S. Korea, Business Anything but Usual; A SurprisinglyAggressive Kim Stuns
Foreign,Korean InvestorsAlike, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1998, at A15.

45 South Korea is the world's eleventh-larges economy. Id.
46 Exchange Rates, supra note
20.
41 Closed IndonesianBanks, supra note 30.
48 Kattoulas, supra note 42.

49 Chaebols are largely credited with Korea's enormous economic growth. Joongi Kim,
Cultural
Differences in the CrusadeAgainst InternationalBribery: Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea and the Foreign
CorruptPracticesAct, 6 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 549, 567 n.95 (1997).

50 Sugawara, supranote 44.
51 The selling of shares in the chaebol to raise capital would lead to the dilution of family control,
which is something the controlling families have been unwilling to do. Id.
52 id.
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chaebols are the main focus of the IMF's restructuring program in Korea, 53
and despite their traditional resistance to change, they are showing a
willingness to agree to reform their business practices.B.

The Help

The IMvF arranged a significant amount of foreign monetary assistance
in the form of loans in an effort to maintain the solvency of Asia's troubled
nations. 55 As a condition of the IMF's assistance, the recipients of the loans
had to agree to various programs of internal restructuring. 56 These programs
differ from previous IMF bailout programs 57 in that they focus less on
macroeconomic policy and more on reforming the financial and corporate
sectors in each country. 58 One of the primary methods of accomplishing
those reforms is a requirement for those sectors to increase their financial
transparency by implementing internationally accepted accounting practices
59
and disclosure rules.

Prior to the crisis in Asia, the IMF's largest bailout program was the
one involving Mexico in 1994, which totaled forty-eight billion dollars. 60 By

comparison, the total package in Asia is expected to be in the neighborhood
53 Don Kirk, Pressure on Chaebol: Change Vow or Break
Up, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 4,
1997, at 1.
54 Asia Learns the 3 Rs -Repent, Repay, Rebuild, THE STRAITS TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998,
at 26.
55 It is estimated that the total amount of assistance channeled through the IMF will be somewhere

in the neighborhood of $118 billion dollars, with some fearing it could reach as high as $163 billion.
Johnson and Sweeney, supra note 3.
56 Fischer Address, supra note 13.
5' See Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF. Address Before the Counsel on Foreign
Relations, New York, (Feb. 6, 1998), available in InternationalMonetary Fund Homepage (visited Mar.

23, 1998) <http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/1998/020698.HTM>.
58 Stanley Fischer stated in a speech that:
Macroeconomic adjustment is not the main element in the programs of Thailand, Indonesia,
and Korea. Rather[,J financial sector restructuring and other structural reforms lie at the heart
of each program-because the problems they deal with, weak financial institutions, inadequate
bank regulation and supervision, and the complicated and non-transparent relations among
governments, banks, and corporations, lie at the heart of the economic crisis in each country.
Fischer Address, supra note 13.
59 See Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, Address Before the Extraordinary
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 24, Caracas, Venezuela, (Feb. 7, 1998), available in International
Monetary Fund Homepage (visited Mar. 23, 1998), <http://www.inf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/
020798.HTM>.
6o Richard Lacayo, IMF to the Rescue; As East Asia Sinks Further into Economic Quicksand, the
InternationalMonitary Fund is Swooping in with Money and Advice. But is the IMF, Whose Biggest
Donor is the US., the Perfect Action Hero, or Will its Help Only Make Matters Worse?, TIME, Dec. 8,

1997, at 36.
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of around one-hundred and eighteen billion dollars divided among several
countries.6 1 The money the IMF uses for its piece of the overall financing

plan 62 comes from deposits made into the IMF from member countries, the
largest depositor being the United States.63 The extent of the current crisis in
Asia has necessitated a request by the IMF to member states to increase the
amount of money deposited into the fund.64 This request has been met with
resistance within the United States Congress. 65 Although the LMF is in no
danger of actually running out of money, increased deposits are necessary to
66
insure continued availability of funds in the future.

In exchange for the loans offered through the IMF, Thailand has agreed
to institute a series of extremely serious and far-reaching measures intended
to facilitate repayment of the loans.67 The first major step the Thai
government has agreed to take is in the restructuring of the banking
industry.68
It intends to implement programs instituting "best banking

practices" 69 and improve the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for

the central bank. 70
In addition to changing banking laws, the Thai
government has committed to adjusting its fiscal policy to account for the
lower levels of revenue and increased demand for social spending. 71 It has

agreed to maintain a strict monetary position in order to stabilize exchange
rates.72 It has also agreed to strengthen its social safety net to deal with rising
61 Johnson and Sweeney, supra note 3.

62 The IMF does not provide the entire financing for the bailout programs. Instead, it coordinates
the rescue package among the various contributing organizations in addition to the amount the IMF
makes available from its own coffers. For examplc, early in the Indonesian crisis, the 1MF bailout
consisted of contributions from IMF ($10 billion), World Bank ($4.5 billion), Asian Development Bank
($3.5 billion), and an additional $18 billion from various other countries. Eric Altbach, Japan, United

States Back Up IMF Indonesian Bailout Plan, JEI REPORT, Nov. 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News

Library, Curnws File. The Korean bailout would be funded by the United States and Japan (giving $20
billion), World Bank ($15 billion), and the rest from the IMF. Andrew Pollack, South Korea Says I.MF.
has Agreed to Huge Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1997, at Al.
63 The IMF currently has around $200 billion dollars in its coffers, with $36 billion (18% of the
total) coming from the United States. Lacayo, supra note 60.
64President Clinton has asked Congress to approve an additional $18 billion worth of funds for use
by the IMF in meeting the demands of the crisis. Although this does not count as an expenditure against
the U.S. budget, it has met with sharp resistance by some members of Capitol Hill who feel this is simply
an effort to "bail out bankers." The Fight to Fund the Fund,THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1998, at 25-26.
65 Id
66 Id.
67 Letter ofIntent, supra note 4.
69 Id.
69 Id.
70 id.

71 id.
72 Id.
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unemployment and falling real wages.73 The Thai government has adopted
bold targets for increasing the role of the private sector in the country's
economy,74 and intends to increase the amount of privatization and legal
reforms.

One of the government's programs for improving financial
transparency was begun before the current economic crisis. In 1992, the
Thai government established a Securities and Exchange Commission
whose primary purpose is to provide the administration necessary both to
develop and supervise the Thai capital markets. 75 As part of that program,
the Securities and Exchange Commission has worked with the Institute of
Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand (ICAAT) to develop new
accounting standards for the country.76 When the crisis occurred, the
Thai government had not yet adopted new accounting standards, but it has
agreed to strengthen both the disclosure
and auditing requirements and
77
accounting practices by the end of 1998.
Indonesia has been much more resistant to implementing the reforms
demanded by the IMF. 7 8 After renewing his county's commitment to
implementing the reforms mandated by the IMF,79 President Suharto later
indicated that the economic reforms demanded by the IMF would violate
the Indonesian Constitution's section on "social well-being."80 Much of
President Suharto's concern is likely based upon the impact the agreement
would have on an already ravaged economy, 8 1 although there is also some
indication that his concern may lay in protecting the vast fortunes amassed
by his friends and family members through government-protected

13 Id.
74 Id.
75 The Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand and the Thai Capital Market,
ASIAMONEY, May 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
76 id.
77 Letter of Intent, supra note 4, at Box 2.

78 Although President Suharto signed Indonesia's first agreement with the IMF in October, he has

yet to make good on many of the promises. Gregg Jones, Suharto's Stand; Leader s Comments Sting
IMF,Spark Uncertainty in Indonesia, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 10, 1998, at ID. "To be sure,

Jakarta did not help itself much by not showing serious commitment to its reforms."

Susan Sim,

Flexibility the Buzzword, STRAJTS TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at 8.
'9 Michel Camdessus, IMF and Indonesia Agree on Accelerated Economic Reforms, 27 IMF
SuRvEy 17-19 (1998).
80 Jones, supra note 78.
s1 "A number of analysts agree that Suharto can validly argue that imposing further austerity

measures on a nation that is already reeling from soaring inflation and unemployment would be a
mistake ... " Id.
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monopolies.82 The necessity of improving transparency and accounting
standards is even more acute in Indonesia where they do not have general
auditing and reporting requirements,8 3 and the general accounting
principles in the country are significantly divergent from international
standards8 4 As of this writing, it is still unclear whether Indonesia will
fully accept the program offered by the IMF or if it will shirk the help and
possibly send itself, and perhaps the rest of the world, into an even deeper
85
financial crisis.

South Korea was well on its way to implementing much of the

reform program by the time it submitted its "Letter of Intent" to the IMF.86
The "Letter" describes in detail Korea's plans for implementing changes in

the following areas: macroeconomic policy (e.g. monetary policy,
exchange rate policy, reserve management, and fiscal policy); financial
sector restructuring of both merchant and commercial banks as well as
improving the legislative and regulatory structure for the industry; and
capital account liberalization, trade liberalization, labor market reform and
social safety net improvement as well as corporate governance and
restructuring (focusing on transparency and accountability to
shareholders).8 7 South Korean President Kim Dae-jung has helped pave
the way for implementation of the IMF program in key ways: first, by
getting the nation's four largest conglomerates to agree to the transparency

reforms outlined by the IMF,88 and then by getting organized labor to

82 For a discussion of the role Suharto's six children and other business cohorts play in the
economic life of Indonesia, see Handley, supra note 36.
83 COOPERS & LYBRAND, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING SUMMARIES: A GUIDE
FOR INTERPRETATION
AND COMPARISON 1-28 (2nd ed. 1993).
8' The Indonesian Accounting Principles differ from the IAS in how they account for joint ventures,
foreign currency, government grants and assistance, research and development. Id. at 1-44-45.
85 On May 21, 1998, ater weeks of political turmoil and deadly riots
within Indonesia, President
Suharto resigned. He was immediately replaced by his former Vice President, B.J. Habibie. The
questions of how Habibie will deal with Indonesia's economic crisis, and whether his presidency will be
accepted by the Indonesian people, may take some time to be answered. Keith B. Richburg, WASH. POST,
May 21, 1998, at Al.
86 South Korea has signed a Letter of Intent dated February 7, 1998 and
addressed to Michel
Chamdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, in which it outlines measures already undertaken and lists
the measures it intends to implement in conjunction with the IMF financial package. Government of
South Korea, Letter of Intent, available in International Monetary Fund Homepage (visited Mar. 26,
1998) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/020798.htm>. See supra note 4 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the term Letter of Intent.
87 id.
88 DJ to Stress Major Self-Reform by Big Groups, KOREA HERALD, Feb. 5, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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agree to legislation allowing crippled businesses to lay
off workers who
89
have previously been guaranteed lifetime employment.
III.

MUTUAL FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

FinancialTransparencyin the United States

When formulating solutions for Asia's lack of transparency, looking to
the United States' example can provide useful insight. All mutual funds 90 in
the United States are governed by The Investment Company Act of 1940
(hereinafter Act)9 1 and the regulations promulgated pursuant to it. 92 The basic

intent of the Act has been described as follows:
The ... Act ...

establishes a comprehensive federal regulatory

framework for investment companies. Regulation of investment
companies is designed to: prevent insiders from managing the

companies to their benefit and to the detriment of public
investors; 93 prevent the issuance of securities having inequitable
or discriminatory provisions; 94 prevent the management of
investment companies by irresponsible persons; 95 prevent the

use of unsound or misleading methods of computing earnings
and asset value; 96 prevent changes in the character of investment
companies without the consent of investors; 97 ensure the

disclosure of full and accurate information about the companies
and their sponsors.98 To accomplish these ends, the Investment
89 Don Kirk, Korean Unions ReluctantlyAgree to Layoffs, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 1998, at 1.

'0 The Supreme Court has defined a mutual fund as:
A mutual fund is an open-end investment company. The ... Act... defines an investment
company as an 'issuer' of 'any security' which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily
*** in the business of investing *** in securities ***.' 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(21), 80a-3(a)(1).
An open-end company is one 'which is offering for sale or has outstanding any redeemable
security of which it is the issuer.' 15 U.S.C. §80a-5(a)(l)
Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 625 n. 11 (1971).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1997).
9' 15 C.F.R. § 200.1-290.101 (1998).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1997).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (1997).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9 (1997).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1997).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-13 (1997).
98 Referring to investment companies, 15 U.S.C § 80a-29 (1997).
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Company Act ... restricts greatly transactions with affiliates, 99
limits leveraging, 10 0 and imposes governance requirements as a

check on fund management. '0 '

The emphasis of the Act is to protect investors through a process of fill
and accurate disclosure.' 0 2 Most of the Act's provisions deal with the formation
and operation of the mutual fund. 10 3 Nowhere in the Act does it require mutual
funds to purchase equity in any particular type of company, nor does it require
that the companies owned within a mutual fund's portfolio meet minimum
accounting and disclosure requirements themselves. 1°4 The Act does, however,
regulate the percentage of a portfolio company that a mutual fund is allowed to
own,105 and how the fund's assets must be distributed, depending on the nature
of the fund. 10 6 These requirements help to ensure that the structure and operation
of a mutual fund is transparent to individuals seeking to invest in a particular
fund.
The transparency of corporate securities traded within the United States is
assured by the laws and regulations promulgated as part of the Securities and
Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934.107 When Congress passed the 1933 Act, it
focused primarily on requiring extensive disclosure for the distribution of newly
issued public securities. 10 8 Examples of the disclosure requirements set forth in
the 1933 Act are: (1) the registration of securities with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) before they are offered for sale; and (2) the
distribution of prospecti providing detailed information about the company to
potential investors.° 9
99 15 U.S.C. § 80a-56 (1997).
:0 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12 (1997).
101 This statement is taken from an Extension of Remarks submitted by
Congressman John D.
Dingell of Michigan into the congressional record as part of the debate over impending legislation. 142

CONG. REC. E1938-05. available in 1996 WL 602735. This statement is a fair reflection of the language

found in the Investment Company Act of 1940's declaration and policy section. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1997).

:02 See supra note 100.
03 Id.
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1997).
los The Act requires that any diversified mutual fund may not own more
than 10% of any company
within its portfolio. 15 U.S.C. §80a-12(c) (1997); See also Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the
Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1472-6 (1991).

106SEC guidelines require at least 65% of a fund's assets to be invested in the fund's primary area of
emphasis, In re Alliance North America, No. 95 Civ. 0330, 1996 WL 551732 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1996)
(citing 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. 51,208, 39252.).
107 15 U.S.C. § 78a
(1994).
'08 See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 36 (1988).

'09 Id. at 87-92.
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The 1934 Act deals with the trading of securities after they have been
issued." The 1934 Act protects investors in a number of ways: it requires a
corporation to continue making regular disclosure of its financial position to the
SEC;"' l a corporation is required to register the proxy statements it uses for
gaining shareholder approvals; 1 2 when certain tender offers are made for the
purchase of a publicly traded company, the contents of the offer must be filed
with the SEC; 113 corporations are also prohibited in a number of ways from
engaging in various forms of insider trading;" 4 and investors are protected from
false or fraudulent statements or omissions made by individuals in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities." 5
The SEC helps to ensure financial transparency within the registration and
disclosure functions by requiring financial data to conform with the United
States' generally accepted accounting principles (hereinafter GAAP). 16 The
requirement to conform with GAAP extends to registration of mutual funds as
well. 1 7 The transparencies mandated by the SEC extend to both the exchanges
where securities are traded" 8 and to the individual companies traded on those
protect investors like
exchanges."l 9 This system of complete transparency helps
20
no other securities regulation scheme in the world today.'
121
OverseasFunds in the United States

B.

Investors in overseas mutual funds are subjected to a significant risk
exposure based upon the nature of the funds' investments in foreign capital
110 Id. at 36.

.. Id. at 405-38.
112 Id. at 449-97.
113 Id. at 497-541.
14 Id. at 541-89.
11
116

17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1998).
Id. § 210.4-01 (1998).

I"
Id. § 210.3-18 (1998).
"The SEC has thus identified "transparency," or equalization of information about prices,
quotations, volumes, orders, and similar information, as a key regulatory goal." Paul G. Mahoney,
Technology, Property Rights in Information, and Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U.L.Q. 815, 845
(1997).
119 Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparencyand Corporate Governance: You Manage What You
Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1996).
120 Id. at 1335.
121 "Overseas mutual funds" includes the following types of mutual funds: 1) International funds,
118

these funds invest only in securities of non-U.S. issuers; 2) Global funds, these funds invest in securities of
both domestic and foreign issuers; and 3) Country funds, these funds invest in securities of foreign issuers
located in a single jurisdiction or country. S. Janc Rose, The New Wave of InternationalFunds, 582
PCI/CORP 123, 126 (1987).
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markets. 122 Overseas mutual fund disclosure statements will often delineate, in
great detail, the general risks associated with purchasing shares in the fund. 123
Among the factors often listed are: (1) the volatility of exchange rates due to the
forces of supply and demand, foreign government intervention, and market
speculation; 124 (2) the risks associated with political and economic uncertainty in
many foreign jurisdiction due to the potential for confiscatory taxation, general
instability, lack of U.S.-type regulatory oversight and disclosure of the financial
condition of foreign corporation; 125 and (3) the fact that foreign markets are often
less liquid which can lead to greater price volatility of a portfolio's securities. 126
The risks of investing in overseas mutual funds has been particularly acute
in funds which include securities from Asia to any large degree. 127 The region
witnessed radical exchange rate devaluation, 128 bank failures, 129 and periods of
social and political unrest, 130 all during the last half of 1997. All of these
problems were exacerbated by a lack of financial transparency in both the
government and private sectors.' 3' At a minimum, the adoption of internationally
accepted accounting standards 132 (hereinafter "LAS") by these countries would
have provided investment decision-makers with the financial information
necessary to make informed choices. For example, South Korea has its version
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), 133 but they deviate
122An example of a risk disclosure is "RISK CONSIDERATIONS:
The net asset value of the Fund's
shares will fluctuate with changes in the market value of its portfolio securities and foreign currency rate
fluctuations. The market value of the Fund's portfolio securities will increase or decrease due to a variety
of economic, market or political factors which cannot be predicted." DEAN WITrER GLOBAL ASSET
ALLOCATION FUND, FORM N-IA REGISTRATION STATEMENT, at 10, (Dec. 23, 1997),
available in
Securities and Exchange Commission Homepage (visited May 13, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/ data/931988/0000950136-97-001860.txt>.
'23Id. at 11.
124 Id.

125Id.
126 Id.

127During the second half of 1997, stock exchanges
throughout most of Asia lost significant
percentages of their total value (Hong Kong (39%), Indonesia (33%), Malaysia (47%), Philippines (30%),
South Korea (25%)). International Economy: Asia, supra note 25.
12 Thalif Deen, Finance. Global Investors Retain Confidence in Asia, Inter Press Service, Mar. 22,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
129 Id.
130 Economy/Researchers Urge Policy Revamp to Meet Targets Act Now, Don 'tWait for IMF,Says
Chalongphob: Prompt Moves Would Send Right Signals, BANGKOK POST, Jan. 30, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
131 Fischer Address, supra note 13.
132 International accounting standards ("IAS") are promulgated by the International Accounting
Standards Committee (established in 1973). The IASs have no independent force behind them until they
are adopted by individual countries. COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 83, at IAS-1.
133 Id. at K-1.
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significantly from the IAS. 134 Indonesia has adopted its own version of
accounting standards ("PA") which fail to conform with the IAS in many
significant ways. 135 Additionally, Indonesia has yet to formulate any general
audit and reporting requirements, but audits are required for companies listed on
accounting
their stock exchange. 136 Thailand was in the process of implementing
37
occurred.1
crisis
the
when
IAS
meet
to
intended
standards
Investors may feel that they were misinformed or misled regarding the
risks they were assuming and wish to sue their mutual fund companies, and/or
the fund's managers, for losses they sustained as a result of the crisis in Asia.
They will have difficulty winning their suits, however, because the events which
took place in Asia were ones falling among those risks likely to have been
disclosed to the investor. 138 This difficulty was experienced by a group of
investors when they attempted to recover losses suffered as a result of the
Mexican peso crisis in 1994.139 The district court found that the fund had
sufficiently disclosed the risks associated with the fund's investment in Mexico
and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. 140 The investors were essentially told
the mere
that they had been provided all of the protection mandated by law by
1
disclosure of generalized risks associated with international investing. 41
C.

The Impact of the Crisis on U.S. Investors

At the end of 1996, mutual funds in the United States had a total asset
value of over three and one-half trillion dollars. 142 This investment level is an

134 Some of the deviations are in how accounting is done for joint ventures, government grants and
assistance, and taxation. Id. at K-20-2 1; The chaebols have failed to adhere to generally accepted
accounting practices by not releasing comprehensive financial statements and by subsidizing loans across

subsidiaries. Evelyn Iritani, S. Korean FirmsAnnounce Reforms; Asia: FourMajor Conglomerates Vow
Sweeping Changes that Would Reduce Their Control Over Ailing Economy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at

A8.

135 COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 84 at 1-44.
36 Id. at 1-28.
137 Thailand

is formulating Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in conjunction with their

overall process of financial system modernization. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand
and the Thai CapitalMarket, supra note 75.
138See DEAN WITTER, supra note 122.
139In 1994, the Mexican government stopped supporting the peso's exchange rate and allowed it to

float against the dollar. This caused the peso to devalue by over 15% against the dollar and led to a sharp
depreciation in the value of Mexican securities held mutual funds. In re Alliance North America, No. 95
Civ. 0330, 1996 WL 551732 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1996).
140 id.
141 id.
142 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, MuTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 1 (1997).
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increase of over twenty-five percent from the previous year. 14 3 Mutual funds
have become the second largest financial intermediaries in the United States
in terms of total asset value, behind only commercial banks. 144 In 1996,
investment funds which focus primarily on investing in equities accounted for
almost half of the total investment value held in mutual funds. 145 This level of
investment is a thirty-eight percent increase in total value from the previous
year. 146 Half of the increase in asset value has been due to appreciation of the
47
portfolio assets. 1
The mutual fund industry has also seen a tremendous increase in the
amount of money United States citizens have invested in overseas funds over
the last fifteen years. 148 Total assets in overseas funds now totals threehundred and twenty-one billion dollars. 49 This amount is roughly one-tenth
of the total mutual fund assets invested in the U.S. 150 Foreign emerging
capital markets have also seen substantial growth in their relative
importance.'15 In 1995, these markets accounted for almost eleven percent of
the world's total market capitalization, 52 compared to just under four percent
in 1986. 15
The equity crisis in Asia has had a substantial impact on investors
throughout the world, Alan Greenspan recently stated:
Asian equity losses, including Japan, since June 1997 worldwide
are estimated to have exceeded $700 billion of which more than
$30 billion has been lost by U.S. investors. Substantial further
losses have been recorded in bonds and real estate. 154

143 id.
144Id. at 2.
145 Mutual funds emphasizing equity investment had asset values
totaling 1.751 trillion dollars in
1996. Id.
146 Id.
147 1e.

148The amount of cash flowing into overseas mutual
funds grew from a total of $900 million in

1984 to 46.3 billion in 1996. Id. at 4-5.
149 id. at 46.

so Total assets invested are 3.5 trillion with overseas fund assets accounting for 321 billion, or
roughly ten percent Id. at 1, 46.
151Id at 47.
152Id.

153Id. This data is compiled from the year ending in December 1996 and will undoubtedly
show
significant change when the 1997 numbers are published.
154Alan Greenspan, Hearing Before House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services,
(Jan. 30,
1998) available at 1998 WL 8991405.
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These losses were driven by the collapse of the equity market in Asia during
the last half of 1997,55 and by the devaluation of currencies throughout the

region.15 6 Uncertainty in the Asian 5markets
has led to significant withdrawal
7

of capital by mutual fund investors. 1
Investors owning shares in certain individual Asian-based mutual funds
158
have been devastated by the crisis. Merrill Lynch's Emerging Tiger Fund
lost nearly one half of its total asset value during 1997.159 This performance
was similar to that seen in Prudential's Pacific Growth Fund which saw its
price swing during the last year from a high of seventeen dollars and twenty
cents to a low of eight dollars and seventy-seven cents-a decrease of fortynine percent.160 Merrill Lynch's Developing Capital Fund and Pacific Basin
Fund, Putnam's Asian Pacific Growth Fund, and Nomura's Pacific Basin
Fund all saw substantial losses last year as well. 161
IV.

THE UNITED STATES' ROLE IN THE SOLUTION

A.

The IMF

The IMF came into existence on July 22, 1945, at a conference held in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. 162 On July 31, 1945, the United States
1ss Some examples of the losses sustained between June 1997 and January 1998 are Hong Kong
(39%), Indonesia (33%), Malaysia (47%), and South Korea (25%). InternationalEconomy: Asia, supra
note 25.
i"6 Edward Wyatt, The Market Turmoil: The Investors; Despite Market Turmoil, Cash Keeps
PouringInto Mutual Funds,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1997, at D1.
1'7 "According to UBS Securities (East Asia) Ltd., U.S. investors pulled a net US$38.2 million out
of 98 U.S.-registered Asian mutual funds in the week ended Oct. 22, [1997. That brought the total
outflow from Asian mutual-fund sector to US$1.2 billion so far this year." Pui-Wing Tam, As Markets
Dive, Stock Sales Spur Redemptions, Sparking More Sales, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1997, available
in 1997 WL 14695800.
'58 The Emerging Tiger Fund is a mutual fund which invests primarily in emerging market
countries in the Pacific Basin like Thailand, China, Indonesia, etc. MERRILL LYNCH EMERGING TIGERS
FUND, INC., PROSPECTUS (1998).
's9 The fund lost an average of approximately 50% across the four classes of shares. Merrill Lynch,
Merrill Lynch OnLine (visited May 13, 1998) <http://www.plan.ml.com>.
'60 DBC Online, supra note 7.
161 Some examples of losses are Merrill Lynch's Developing Capital Fund (high-S17.91 low-S11.04
loss-38%o), Pacific Basin Fund (high-S26.84 low-$16.49 loss-38%), Putnam's Asian Pacific Growth Fund
(high-S14.86 low-$10.26 loss-31%), and Nomura's Pacific Basin Fund (high-$15.47 low-$9.40 loss39%). DBC Online, supra note 7.
162It is often referred to as the "Bretton Woods Agreement." The World Bank was created
at that
time. International Monitary Fund, Over Half a Century of Challenge and Change: Highlights of the
IMF's Evolution, (visited Mar. 29, 1998) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/sup0997/
14chrono.htm>.
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passed legislation authorizing the President to accept membership into the
IMF on behalf of the United States. 163 The Articles of Agreement were
signed in Bretton Woods, and went into effect on December 27, 1 9 4 5 .'64 The
IIMF began actual operation on March 1, 1947.165
The IMF's Articles of Agreement expressly state the purpose for the
Fund's existence. 166 That being: (1) to promote international monetary
cooperation and to provide support on international monetary problems; (2) to
facilitate trade and economic expansion throughout the world; (3) to promote
exchange stability among its members; (4) to assist in the establishment of a
multilateral system of payments for current transactions among members; and
(5) to help members by making the general resources of the Fund available to
them under adequate safeguards, thus allowing them to fix their balance of
67
payment problems without causing serious harm to international prosperity. 1
The IMF's general resources exist as the result of deposits, referred to
as quotas, made into the Fund by member nations. 168 The original quota
levels were established by the Articles of Agreement, and are subject to
change by a vote of an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting
membership. 169 This increase in quotas is subject to the member states
individually agreeing to the new amount of their quota. 7 ° The IMF's Board
of Governors recently adopted a resolution increasing the total quota amount
by forty-five percent over its previous level. 171
The United States portion of the quota increase equals fourteen and
one-half billion dollars. 172 Recently, President Clinton has also asked for a
three and one-half billion dollar contribution to a special line of credit to be
used by the Fund in certain emergencies. 17 Despite the fact that the quota
increase is not technically an expenditure incurred by the United States' 74 and
163The only condition placed upon the authority to accept membership by the President was that a
copy of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund be deposited in the archives of the Department of State. 22
U.S.C.A. § 286 (West 1998).
" International Monitary Fund, supra note 162.
165id.
'66 International Monetary Fund, Articles ofAgreement of the InternationalMonetary Fund, (visited
March 29, 1998) <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm>.
167 Id art. I (emphasis added).
1 Id. art. Itt
169Id art. III, § (2)(c).
170 Id. art. II1, § (2)(d).
171Board of Governors Adopts Quota Resolution; Members Must Take Steps to Consent to

Increases, IMF SURVEY, Feb. 9, 1998, at 38, 38.

72 The Fight to Fundthe Fund, supra note 64, at 25.

173

Id.

174 id.
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the money lent by the IMF will be paid back with interest, 75 the United
State's Congress has delayed approving the money requested by President
Clinton. 176 Opposition to the increased quota has come from both the
political left and right. 177 The right is hoping for an opportunity to require
reforms within the IME as a condition to the new quota. 78 It is also unhappy
with the money being used to support economies which compete with the
United States, and they believe the government should not be intervening in
the world's financial markets. 179 The political right also does not like the idea
80
of the funds being used to bail out banks who made bad lending decisions.'
The left on the other hand does not like the money being used to support
governments who do not meet standards of behavior concerning human
rights. 181
B.

Domestic Solutions

If the United States Congress is concerned about requirements the IMF
places upon nations who receive loan packages, 8 2 one way it can affect those
changes more quickly and with less international controversy 8 3 is by passing
domestic legislation which would impose upon mutual funds a requirement to
increase the level of disclosure concerning the financial position of the
equities in their portfolio. The intent of more detailed disclosure requirements
would be to create additional information which would allow investors to
make more accurate risk assessments. Accurate risk assessment would lead,
in theory, to an increase in investment in mutual funds whose portfolio
securities meet minimal levels of transparency.
175Harry Dunphy, US: World Bank Chief- Approval of New IMF Funding is Essential, AAP
Newsfeed, Mar. 26, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
176 Nancy Dunne, Congressto Delay New IMF Funding, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 4, 1998, at 7.
177Laura D'Andrea Tyson, If There Were No IMF, They'd Have to invent One,
Bus. WEEK, Mar. 9,
1998, at 21.
' Included in the reform measures is a provision in the Senate's bill requiring the lowering of trade

barriers by countries receiving loans, and a measure in the House's version includes language requiring
nations receiving loans to place limits on abortions. Lorraine Woellert, Senate OKs Funds for IMF;
House PlansAbortion Curb, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at A4.
"9 Tyson, supra note 177.
'80 The Fight to Fund the Fund,supra note 64.
181Tyson, supra note 177.
182See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
183 The unwillingness of the United States to readily

increase its quota has led to international
criticism about its leadership on economic issues. For example, "[y]ou cannot claim to be a world
power... [or]
have a free trade system, equity and stability around the world without (the U.S.) fulfilling
obligations." Harry Dunphy, supra note 175 (quoting James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank).
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Another possible solution would be to regulate directly the types of
equities in which mutual funds are allowed to invest. The direct regulation of
mutual fund investment would make it illegal for U.S. mutual funds to invest
in companies whose principle place of business is in a country that does not
live up to the financial reporting standards imposed within the legislation.
Congress could begin with a requirement that all securities owned within a
mutual fund's portfolio meet the requirements established by the International
Accounting Standards Committee for generally accepted international
84
accounting and reporting standards. 1
1.

Asia

One of the explanations given for how Asia came to be in such a desperate
situation is that the region generally lacks financial transparency. 185 This lack of
transparency exists not only in the corporate and financial sectors, 186 but in the
government as well. 187 The lack of transparency has contributed to more than
just the cause of the crisis, it has also made efforts to fix it much more
complicated.188 The IMF has made the increase in financial transparency within
the recipient countries one of the primary cornerstones to its Asian relief
programs.' 89 Whether full transparency can ever actually be attained in these
countries is a question to be answered at a later time. For the purposes of this
Comment, it is assumed that while transparency may never be fully achieved, any
progression toward that end is worthy of programs aimed at improving investor
protections through increased financial transparency.
U.S. investors sustained substantial losses as a result of the crisis in
Asia.' 90 The only information investors had regarding the risk of their
investments in the troubled Asian countries was in the form of boiler plate
language buried in the middle of the fund's prospectus.' 9' When read from the
view hindsight provides after the crisis in Asia took place, it appears that the risk
disclosure statements in a fund's prospectus essentially say that there will be no
184 For a general discussion of the International Accounting Standards Committee and the IAS's
promulgated by it, see COOPERS & LYBRAND, supra note 83, at IAS-l-26.
185 Kalathil, supra note 6.
186Seoul, IMF End First Round of Talks, Initial Bailout to Come This Week,
Agence Fr. Presse,
Nov. 30, 1997, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
187 Transparency Needed to Boost Public Trust, JAKARTA POST,
Nov. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
188Fischer Address, supra note 13.
189 Camdessus, supranote 59.
19o Greenspan, supra note 154.
191 See DEAN WITTER, supra note 122.
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disclosure about the actual underlying financial positions of the companies held
in the fund. 19 2 Surely, a publicly traded U.S. corporation would not meet its
reporting requirements if it made a disclosure to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the general public, in which it stated that its financial
statements were likely to be either non-existent or completely inaccurate. Yet,
this is exactly the type of company in which an overseas mutual fund is allowed
to purchase shares with funds from U.S. investors. 193 When a mutual fund
invests in United States securities and subsequently reports its major holdings to
the SEC and its shareholders, the shareholders then have the opportunity to
independently determine the wisdom of those investments and can then change
funds if they do not like the fund's investment choices. With an overseas fund,
many of the securities held within the fund and reported to its shareholders
cannot be independently evaluated because those company's financial
information is not available, nor is it required to be disclosed to shareholders.
The lack of information denies the fund's shareholders the opportunity to make
an evaluation and to alter their investment decisions if they disagree with the
fund's specific investment choices.
Congress has provided exceptional mechanisms for protecting individuals
who invest in securities traded within the United States in the form of the
Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934,194 and the Investment Company
Act of 1940.195 Congress has ensured almost complete transparency of United
States corporate securities, 196 and has established significant disclosure
requirements over the management and operation of mutual funds. 197 Congress
has not yet, however, taken the steps necessary to protect U.S. investors whose
money is used to purchase nearly unregulated securities which are held in the
portfolios of overseas mutual funds.
The adequate protection of United States overseas mutual fund investors
cannot be achieved through the general disclosure of risks which are involved in
virtually all overseas investing. This general disclosure is exactly the type that
currently exists in the prospecti of overseas mutual funds.' 98 The devastating
losses sustained by United States investors in Asia' 99 and the extent those losses
were reflected in falling mutual fund share prices truly demonstrated how
192Id.

193Id.
'9' 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
'9' 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1997).
196See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
'9'15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1997).
'98See DEAN WirrER, supra note 122.
'99ImplicationsofAsian Financial,supra note 154.
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vulnerable United States investors were to the risks associated with investing in
unregulated securities markets. Given the losses incurred by investors, the
current system of securities and mutual
fund regulation has not performed its
200
stated objective of protecting investors.
2.

Solutions

One way of achieving greater investor protection would be through
United States legislation requiring detailed disclosures by mutual funds as
to the nature and extent of the financial information available regarding the
assets held in its portfolio. A simple way of doing this would be for the
fund to list the securities in its portfolio which meet internationally
accepted accounting standards, and which securities do not meet those
standards. Investors who seek lower risk would be able to see from a
fund's disclosures whether its investment policy was to invest in securities
which do not meet IAS. The investor could then choose to move their
money into funds which report a greater percentage of their holdings in
companies adhering to IAS. A lower risk tolerance by a significant
number of investors would increase demand for mutual funds who's
investment policy provided the additional protection of IAS.
The increased capital flow into those funds with lower risk would
lead corporations who wished access to that capital to improve their
accounting practices so as to be considered candidates for that fund's
investment. The increased transparency provided by these corporations
would be good for every investor holding securities in those corporations.
This solution, however, would impose an extremely high burden on mutual
fund managers. They would be required to regularly determine whether
each company in their portfolio was actually complying with the
transparency requirements the fund promised to its shareholders.
A more dramatic and effective solution would be for Congress to
pass legislation which would establish a minimum level of accurate and
complete financial information required to be present before a publicly
traded mutual fund could purchase securities in any company. This plan
could be accomplished in the international context by determining which
country's capital markets provided adequate safeguards for ensuring the
transparency of the securities traded, and allowing only the securities from
those counties to be held in a mutual fund's portfolio. The plan would
200 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, 80a-1 (1997).
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force countries who wished access to the tremendous sums of capital
available through direct investment by United States mutual funds 2 ' to
take the steps necessary to meet the established requirements if they
wished to maintain their desired levels of foreign investment. This level of
protection for investors against unreasonable risk associated with
securities trading is consistent with the current state of securities
regulation in the United States20 2 and should be extended to the protection
of investors in mutual funds.
While looking out for the security of United States' investors,
Congress would also be helping to ensure the success of the IMF
programs instituted in Asia. They could do this by setting the minimal
amount of acceptable information necessary to allow mutual fund
participation in foreign capital markets, equal to those requirements
outlined in the IMF programs. 203 The establishment of a prohibition
against mutual fund investment in countries without adequate financial
transparency would provide those countries with a powerful incentive not
only to improve their financial transparency for the purposes of
maintaining their IMF financing, but also to improve their financial
reporting standards to be eligible to receive all of the direct investment
available from United States' mutual funds.
V.

CONCLUSION

The financial crisis in Asia has had a devastating effect on the lives of
those living within the troubled countries as well as investors whose resources
and wealth were tied into those economies. The United States has done a
remarkable job in protecting its citizens from unjustified investment risks in every
area except in the international arena. The current disclosure requirements
imposed on mutual fund companies do not adequately protect investors from
preventable risk. This problem can be solved through legislation, tailored in
conjunction with the requirements imposed by the LMF, which would provide
investors with the information necessary for them to make truly informed
investment decisions.

201 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 142, at 46.
202 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1997).

203See supra notes 4, 86.

